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Medicine traditionally has been one of the 
preeminent professional occupations in 
American society. Mention the words profes-
sion, autonomy, status, and pay and most 
people think of doctors. Indeed, the power 
and privilege of the occupation have made it 
the target of considerable public and private 
criticism. Recent years, however, have 
witnessed dramatic organizational changes in 
the practice of medicine, changes that have 
fundamentally altered not only the nature 
and conditions of physicians' work but the 
primary form of health care services available 
to consumers as well. 
There are a variety of indicators of the 
changing status of the medical profession. 
One is the growing numbers of physicians 
that practice within the confines of bureau-
cratic organizations. Over the last twenty 
years, the proportion of self-employed 
doctors has declined steadily while the 
number of doctors employed as salaried 
workers in large-scale health organizations 
has grown rapidly. Such organizations can 
offer doctors ready access to colleagues and 
costly medical technology, but this often 
occurs at the price of a marked loss of auton-
omy. Particularly in the last decade, increased 
efforts at cost control by government agencies 
and insurance companies have often led to 
the adoption of organizational policies that 
severely constrain doctors' autonomy. 
Independent physicians have also felt the 
impact of forces that are bringing about 
changes in medicine. The specter of malprac-
tice suits has significantly influenced physi-
cians' decision making; in response to this 
threat, many doctors feel forced to limit their 
own discretion and to rely on standardized 
procedures. 
In addition, a number of physicians in 
private practice have witnessed precipitous 
declines in income in recent years. For 
example, one group practice reported that 
between 1982 and 1985, the average income of 
its members declined by over 40 percent. In 
some metropolitan areas, the starting salaries 
of new physicians in group practices are 
lower in absolute dollars than they were five 
years ago. Such dramatic declines reflect a 
variety of forces: decreasing insurance 
reimbursements, increased government 
regulation, increasing malpractice premiums, 
and the increasing cost of medical technology. 
In this context, young doctors confronted 
with the problem of paying off large loans for 
medical education face an unsettling future. 
Current medical school costs are as high as 
$21,000 a year, while financial support for 
medical education has been cut back sharply 
in the last decade. Thus, declining salaries 
combined with enormous education costs 
may make it impossible for many aspiring 
doctors to enter the profession. 
This possibility is consistent with yet 
another indicator of the problems facing 
medicine, the recent decline in applications to 
medical schools. Schools in the U.S. received 
3200 fewer applications in 1987-88 than in the 
previous year. This decline may also reflect 
the growing disenchantment of practitioners 
with medical work. One medical school dean 
was astounded when he asked an entering 
class how many of them had been told by a 
doctor not to enter the profession and found 
that over 80 percent raised their hands. 
In order to evaluate the full impact of such 
changes on physicians' work and the health 
care system, it is necessary to understand the 
forces bringing change about. Thus, we begin 
by providing a brief history of the contempo-
rary medical care system, then turn to an 
assessment of current trends and their 
consequences for the practice of medicine. 
The Evolution of American 
Medicine 
The Flexner Report (1910), a highly critical 
review of medical education in the U.S., is 
often identified as a turning point in the 
development of contemporary medicine. This 
report proposed standardizing and upgrad-
ing the requirements and curriculum for 
medical schools; and it suggested that the 
large number of medical schools that could 
not conform to the higher standards should 
be shut down. The physician-controlled 
medical system which was to dominate 
American health care for the next six decades 
became firmly institutionalized soon after the 
report's issuance, although the precise role of 
the report in the creation of this system is 
debated. 
According to the ideological model on 
which the medical care system was now 
based, strong professional norms would 
guide doctors' work, preventing individuals 
from abusing their positions of trust and 
authority. The adherence of individual 
doctors to these norms was to be enforced by 
colleagues and by the American Medical 
Association (AMA). The AMA controlled 
entry into the profession largely through the 
accreditation of medical schools, with the 
purported aim of ensuring uniform, high-
quality education of physicians. The educa-
tion process was to involve intensive sociali-
zation regarding the norms and ethics of the 
profession, thus laying the foundation for 
effective self-regulation. The specialized body 
of knowledge on which medical practice 
rested presumably made self-regulation 
necessary; only members of the profession 
itself had the knowledge and skill to under-
stand and evaluate medical decisions. 
In this system, the autonomy of the indi-
vidual practitioner was sacrosanct. The 
traditional fee-for-service payment method 
was important because it avoided the need 
for the administrative bureaucracy required 
by other systems of compensation, and so 
decreased the potential for bureaucratic 
control of medical practice. Doctors were 
responsible for protecting the interests of the 
public by controlling prices and quality of 
care; governmental intervention, it was 
argued, would only restrict the professional 
delivery of health care and cause more 
problems. This ideology still exerts a signifi-
cant influence on the delivery of health 
services in the U.S. today. 
The dramatic political shifts of the 1960s, 
however, laid the groundwork for major 
changes in medicine. Acceptance by the 
federal government of responsibility for 
defining and remedying general social 
problems led to the proliferation of social 
welfare programs. Federal involvement in 
medicine grew with increased public demand 
for social services. 
A shortage of doctors in 1963 led to the 
creation of federally funded programs aimed 
at expanding medical education. The antipov-
erty programs of the Johnson administration 
reflected the assumption that bad health was 
an integral part of the poverty cycle. Eventu-
ally, this led to the implementation of two 
major federal programs, Medicare and 
Medicaid. These programs did not lead to a 
large increase in government regulation; 
instead, the intensive lobbying efforts of the 
AMA insured that federal reimbursements 
for service were essentially unrestricted. 
Nonetheless, the AMA continued to object 
strongly to federal intervention, claiming that 
it threatened the doctor-patient relationship. 
By the early 1970s, economic and adminis-
trative problems created by the health care 
efforts of the 1960s were widely apparent. 
The establishment of Medicare and Medicaid 
made the government a primary purchaser of 
medical services. As medical costs rose and 
continued to rise rapidly, both federal and 
state budgets were strained. In response, a 
variety of commissions and agencies were 
created and charged with examining ways to 
increase the cost effectiveness of the medical 
system. 
At the same time, public concern with the 
power of the medical profession began to be 
voiced. The right-to-health-care movement 
made its debut, its proponents citing in-
stances of abuse of patients and demanding 
more stringent regulation to assure patients' 
rights. The media also took up the crusade, 
spotlighting stories about families that were 
destroyed by huge medical bills. The passage 
of laws during this period, such as the "right 
to informed consent" and the right to look at 
one's own medical records, reflected the 
intensive lobbying efforts of health care 
activists. These laws, among others, were 
incorporated as the Patients' Bill of Rights, 
which was adopted in 1972 by the American 
Hospital Association. 
One aspect of medical care that generated 
particular concern in these health care 
activists was the traditional fee-for-service 
payment system. Critics charged that this 
system discouraged preventive health care, 
thus ultimately raising health care costs. 
Moreover, it was viewed as rewarding 
doctors for the use of excessive tests and 
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service costs meant larger profits for the 
doctors. 
When initially proposed in the 1960s by 
liberal members of Congress in the context of 
a national plan, the prepayment system was 
considered radical and even subversive. It 
was the Nixon administration, however, that 
adopted HMOs as part of its health policies, 
calling it an efficient management strategy 
that would encourage doctors to be respon-
sible for costs. As Paul Starr, writing in 1983, 
contended, "The socialized medicine of one 
era had become the corporate reform of the 
next." Support for HMOs in the Nixon 
administration was short-lived however. The 
attempts at regulation and government 
control of medicine were strongly rebuffed by 
both national and local medical associations 
through a string of lawsuits, which managed 
at least temporarily to slow down changes in 
the medical system. 
It is important to note that professional 
associations were not the only barriers to 
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hospitalizations. For patients enrolled in 
Medicare and Medicaid programs, doctors 
knew that the government, not the patient, 
would be paying for extra services. In a 
number of well-publicized cases, some 
doctors were found to have routinely ordered 
unnecessary tests and overnight hospital 
stays in order to receive higher reimburse-
ments. 
Concern with the financial problems and 
abuses of the medical care system led to a 
growing interest in prepaid health insurance, 
and particularly in the development of health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs), organi-
zations providing a full range of health care 
services for an annual flat fee. Prepaid plans 
were intended to encourage preventive care 
and to discourage doctors from seeking 
unnecessary tests and visits. HMOs were 
assumed to promote effective cost manage-
ment since they received a fixed revenue from 
client members that had to be used to pay for 
all medical costs. Therefore, lower health 
implementing reforms. The traditional 
medical system was and still is a venerated 
institution in the U.S., one that is based on 
mystical and idealized notions of medical 
practice. Its embodiment in the mythical 
image of the country physician, tirelessly 
making rounds of house calls, is cherished by 
the public. Thus, professional group resis-
tance and public ambivalence led Congress, 
in the spring of 1972, to request that grants 
for HMO projects be halted. 
While these forces helped to limit change 
in medicine at the beginning of the decade, by 
the mid-1970s pressures for change were 
mounting again. During the Carter admini-
stration, the HMO concept was revived, this 
time as a private system involving competi-
tion among independent health services 
organizations for subscribers. Although this 
was intended to be part of a national health 
insurance plan, political battling prevented 
the development and implementation of such 
a plan. However, private HMOs flourished, 
and became an important part of the trend 
toward the "corporatization" of medicine. 
In sum, social changes of the 1960s set the 
stage for major changes in medical services 
delivery. The spread of third-party insurers 
(including the federal government), the 
increased agitation for reform by consumer 
health activists, and spiraling health care 
costs have all contributed to the erosion of the 
traditional system of health care delivery by 
independent practitioners. This system is 
being replaced by one of corporate-style 
medicine, a system in which health services 
are delivered by large, for-profit agencies that 
hire doctors as salaried employees. 
Medicine in the 1980s 
Thirty percent of the nation's community 
hospital beds were part of multi-institutional 
corporations by 1980. During the 1970s, 
nonprofit hospitals increased their number of 
beds by just 28 percent, in sharp contrast to 
the 55 percent increase among for-profit 
hospitals. This growth in part reflects the rash 
of mergers among hospitals occurring in the 
late 1970s and early '80s. It was commonly 
predicted at one point that health care 
services would soon come to be dominated 
by four or five large hospital chains ("Super-
meds"), which would be able to substantially 
lower costs through scale economies. (Cur-
rent evidence shows, however, that the huge 
profits initially enjoyed by hospital chains are 
decreasing; it now appears that the benefits of 
scale are much lower in medicine than 
expected.) 
The trend toward corporate-style medicine 
has had a major impact on the distribution 
and delivery of health care. Because of 
recently imposed caps on reimbursement of 
services for Medicaid and Medicare patients, 
for-profit hospitals are generally reluctant to 
provide treatment for these patients. When 
beds are full, the chains take as few clients of 
these programs as possible. While hospitals 
are required by law to treat emergency 
patients, uninsured patients in for-profit 
hospitals are often transferred quickly to 
public institutions. Thus, stratification among 
hospitals by type of clientele is increasing: the 
poor and elderly are most likely to be found 
in overcrowded and underfinanced public 
institutions. 
Serious questions have been raised about 
the quality of care in independent HMOs and 
in the new walk-in clinics that provide on-
the-spot treatment for routine medical 
problems (sometimes described as "Doc in 
the Box"). Policies designed to minimize costs 
and to increase productivity not only limit 
physicians' autonomy but often have a very 
questionable effect on the appropriate deliv-
ery of medical services. 
In some cases, these policies are reminis-
cent of speed-up practices on factory lines. 
One doctor reported quitting an HMO 
because she was required to see a patient 
every 12.5 minutes. In another case, a doctor 
in a walk-in clinic reported that the clinic 
routinely ranked doctors by the amount they 
had charged patients; doctors at the top of the 
list were favored while those whose charges 
were too low either quit or were fired. Still 
others have told stories about doctors in 
HMOs being given bonuses when they fail to 
refer patients elsewhere. As one doctor with 
experience in an HMO practice stated, "The 
physician is at the mercy of a corporate 
definition of productivity." 
Other practices call into question corporate 
health care providers' commitment to lower-
ing costs for patients. In the case of one walk-
in clinic, administrators exerted strong 
pressures on doctors to keep the diagnostic 
machines busy (x rays and other tests are 
expensive and profitable). The fee for an 
examination was low ($35-$40), but an 
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average of $20 was added to the basic charge 
in test fees. A study by Lewin and Associates 
comparing for-profit and nonprofit hospitals 
in a matched sample from three states found 
that for-profit hospitals not only had higher 
costs but also much higher charges, particu-
larly for subscribers to private health insur-
ance. 
In other cases, costs have been saved 
through the lack of administrative support 
and poor equipment. However, these cost-
competitive pressures take their toll on 
patient well-being. Patients who are admitted 
to hospitals in highly regulated and competi-
tive areas may actually have higher mortality 
rates. One recent study found that hospitals 
in states with the most stringent review 
procedures for certificates of need (which are 
the documents that allow hospitals to ex-
pand) had ratios of actual to predicted death 
rates 5 to 6 percent higher than those hospi-
tals in states with less stringent procedures. 
Despite these problems, there is little sign 
of contraction in the role of corporate enter-
prise in health care delivery. Indeed, continu-
ation of the policies of the Reagan administra-
tion is likely to accelerate current trends. 
Thoughts for the Future 
It is difficult at this point to assess the net 
costs and benefits to society of the striking 
bureaucratization of medical work that has 
occurred in the 1980s. However, the changes 
are having a number of clear consequences. 
From the patients' viewpoint, the days of 
personalized care from a long-standing 
family physician are rapidly disappearing. 
There are both advantages and disadvantages 
to the depersonalization of health service 
delivery. In an emergency, individuals call or 
visit their health service organization and 
must deal with whoever is on call, who may 
or may not be a doctor they know and trust. 
On the other hand, routine appointments 
may be easier to schedule because there is a 
group of doctors available. Whatever pa-
tients' assessment of the net balance of costs 
and benefits of the new arrangements, they 
are unlikely to see a return to a more person-
alized system of doctor-patient relationships. 
It is also clear that current trends entail a 
serious reshaping of doctors' work, imposing 
substantial limits on the traditional autonomy 
and prerogatives of individual practitioners. 
It has been argued that in some instances 
organizational control of doctors' work bears 
a strong resemblance to the de-skilling that 
has taken place in craft occupations. At 
present, the reaction of practitioners to these 
losses is relatively weak and scattered, 
perhaps due in part to the recency of the 
corporate medicine phenomenon. 
However, the lack of response is also due 
to the changes in the last several decades that 
have undercut the AMA's ability to control 
the environment of health services delivery. 
Some blame the association for the problems 
confronting doctors: if it had not so strenu-
ously fought earlier attempts at change, it 
would have been better able to work with the 
government to produce a stronger health care 
system. In any case, its effectiveness as a 
representative of the interests of its members 
has been weakened in recent years. 
One possible response to these problems is 
for the association to move toward a more 
union-like posture in the future. It has been 
suggested that some local medical societies, 
like the Mississippi State Medical Society, are 
already moving in this direction, operating 
their own IP As (Independent Practice Asso-
ciations). The members of these organizations 
collectively sell their medical services to 
organizations, such as insurance firms, 
HMOs, employers, and unions. The members 
negotiate contracts with the payer, and have 
been known to refuse to renew contracts 
because the payer would not meet their 
demands. 
As with other professional workers, 
however, the unionization of doctors raises 
some difficult issues. While a number of 
doctors' unions do exist at present, their 
status is problematic because of the Yeshiva 
decision. Only salaried, nonsupervisory 
physicians can form a union. However, even 
in some salaried positions doctors exercise 
supervisory or managerial reponsibilities. 
Hence, until a clear distinction is drawn 
between professionals and managerial or 
supervisory staff, doctors' unions will run the 
risk of being declared illegal. 
Even without this problem, an effective 
doctors' union would have to be able to 
negotiate with state and federal governments, 
as the AMA has traditionally done, since 
these bodies are the primary source of new 
regulations. In addition, the traditional union 
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weapon is the strike: would doctors be able 
and willing to use this tactic in their negotia-
tions? Unionized physicians in other coun-
tries, such as Israel, have used strikes as well 
as other creative bargaining tactics in their 
negotiations. But refusal to provide treatment 
is contrary to the physicians' code of ethics 
and professionals in this country have often 
been reluctant to use traditional negotiating 
approaches. 
Thus, while changes in the structure of 
medical care presage increased dissatisfaction 
among physicians, the long-term implications 
of this are difficult to predict. It is clear, 
however, that the trend toward replacing 
practitioner control by corporate control may 
well create as many problems in health care 
delivery as it solves. There are obvious 
contradictions in the current situation that 
will require attention soon: simultaneous 
declines in physicians' salaries and increases 
in medical education costs; the growth of for-
profit medical organizations and increasing 
restrictions on reimbursements by insurers; 
the increasing routinization of health service 
delivery and the fundamental ambiguities of 
medical practice. 
These dilemmas need to be given close 
attention in future policy decisions. Incentives 
for cost-cutting must somehow be balanced 
against incentives for the provision of stan-
dard, quality health care. Perhaps a recent 
lesson from the automobile industry is 
applicable here: lowering costs is not the only 
criterion of success. Quality, achieved 
through the granting of autonomy and 
responsibility to producers, is also critical. 
While some constraints on costs are necessary 
precautions against excesses that we have 
sometimes seen in the medical profession, 
that is not the whole solution. The short-run 
priorities of politics should not obscure long-
run public interests in creating a medical 
system that satisfies both the providers and 
direct consumers of medical care services. • 
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